Washington’s Policy: Securing Maritime Navigation, Not Toppling the Houthis

Yemen Monitor/Special writings:

Amid growing reports of U.S.-Gulf discussions about supporting a military campaign against the Houthis, it has become increasingly clear that US policy on Yemen—under both Trump and Biden—has centered on deterring the Houthis without destroying them, and on safeguarding maritime navigation without becoming embroiled in Yemen’s internal conflict. These priorities are pursued with a keen awareness of Saudi interests, which remain central to U.S. calculations.

Reflecting this US approach, international outlets like Reuters and The Wall Street Journal recently reported on U.S. discussions with Saudi and Emirati officials about supporting military units aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized government in a planned ground operation against the Houthis. However, both Gulf nations later denied these reports, as carried again by Reuters and other outlets.

Further reinforcing this direction, the U.S. Embassy posted a brief statement by the U.S. Ambassador on its “X” platform account, confirming that the current campaign, which began after Trump took office last January, targets the military capabilities of the Houthis, not the civilians living under their rule, which he described as “despotic.”

Over recent months, several U.S. officials, including the Secretary of Defense, have reiterated this stance, stressing that the military campaign is solely aimed at deterring the Houthis and preventing attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes—not at toppling their rule or engaging in Yemen’s internal conflict. In other words, eliminating the Houthis is not an objective, and may even be entirely off the table.

In this context, America’s position has not come as a surprise to pragmatic observers, who have long understood the limits of Washington’s role in Yemen—unlike those who have been misled by overly optimistic analysis or propaganda.

For decades, Washington has viewed Yemen almost exclusively through a security lens focused on counterterrorism. This perspective shaped its partnerships with former President Saleh and later with Hadi, and it has primarily relied on drone strikes to achieve narrow security goals.

Even after Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen in 2015 at Hadi’s request to fight the Houthis, the U.S. outlook did not fundamentally change. Instead, it became framed within the broader context of U.S.-Saudi relations, as noted by Gulf affairs expert Adnan Hashim.

From this standpoint, Washington has treated Yemen largely through the Saudi prism, recognizing Riyadh’s outsized influence on Yemeni affairs. Saudi interests have thus been a decisive factor in shaping the US position.

When Trump came to office, the U.S. had already launched a military campaign against the Houthis in response to their increased attacks on maritime shipping—attacks they claimed were in solidarity with Gaza. However, many analysts argue that the Houthis’ motivations went beyond expressing support for Palestinians and were also aimed at achieving domestic political goals and advancing Iran’s regional agenda.

Faced with this situation, the Trump administration had two options: end the Gaza war—which did temporarily reduce Houthi attacks—or negotiate a deal with the Houthis, a move that would have been perceived as a victory for them and was thus never seriously considered.

It’s worth noting that this article does not aim to assess the effectiveness of the current campaign or to compare it with Biden’s approach. Rather, its purpose is to highlight that Trump’s policy is not fundamentally different from that of his predecessor. It remains focused on deterring the Houthis and containing their threat, not on ending their rule on Sana’a or engaging in Yemen’s internal war.

Put differently, Washington’s aim is to bring the Houthis back within pre-defined rules of engagement—ensuring freedom of navigation, nothing more.

That said, the current campaign could still weaken the Houthis’ military and economic capabilities. However, it is too early to gauge the extent of this impact, especially given the lack of a clear timeline for the campaign.

Meanwhile, Yemen’s internationally recognized government, which has long urged the international community to counter the Houthi threat, seems unable to capitalize on this moment—militarily or politically—due to a lack of political will and its dependency on regional alliances that appear uninterested in returning to full-scale war.

On a parallel track, Saudi Arabia had reached understandings with the Houthis, which were supposed to be announced earlier this year. However, the outbreak of the Gaza war and the Houthis’ involvement through maritime attacks prompted the Biden administration to freeze the “roadmap”—a deal in which the Yemeni government was notably not involved.

Some analysts believe Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to resume military escalation in Yemen stems from its focus on major economic projects, which may also explain its rapprochement with Tehran. Others argue that Riyadh has already achieved most of its objectives in Yemen—though not necessarily the ones it declared when it first intervened.

As for the UAE, it has used its involvement in Yemen to expand its influence in the south, including control over strategic islands like Socotra and Mayun. It has also supported the formation of political and military groups that push for partition—an agenda that starkly contradicts the original goals of the Arab coalition.

In light of these developments, I am reminded of remarks I made three months ago during a forum hosted by the Mocha Center for Studies on X, where I noted that Trump’s expected approach toward the Houthis would not significantly differ from that of his predecessor: focused on deterrence, avoiding ground intervention, and shielding Saudi Arabia from direct pressure that might provoke retaliatory Houthi attacks.

Naturally, some continue to propose a limited military action by Yemeni forces to liberate Hodeidah and push the Houthis away from the coast. But even if such a scenario succeeds, it wouldn’t necessarily end Houthi attacks, given their capacity to launch missiles and drones from other areas—meaning the threat would still persist.

In the end, the objective of the U.S. deterrence policy is clear: it has nothing to do with restoring the Yemeni state, which cannot be achieved through external bets. That will require a serious Yemeni strategy and genuine political will. Without those, Yemen will remain a battleground for other powers and their interests—not a platform for reclaiming the state or Yemeni dignity.