Yemen Monitor/Reports Unit/Special:
US President Donald Trump and Omani mediators said on Tuesday that the US and the Houthis in Yemen had reached an agreement to stop US airstrikes against the group after the Iranian-backed militants agreed to stop attacks against US ships in the Red Sea.
The US announcement was surprising. After 50 days and more than 1,200 airstrikes and an Israeli escalation, Trump announced a halt to the attacks. What does this mean and how does it affect the situation in Yemen? Experts answer the questions.
Broader Gulf Coordination
It is clear that Trump sought to achieve this before his visit to the Gulf to send a message to the US public that he is the strong president who achieves goals without waging long wars and a deal-maker capable of completing them quickly.
Naturally, this agreement cannot be separated from the ongoing talks between Washington and Tehran in Muscat, and it is likely that Tehran played a key role in pushing the Houthis towards this option, as it needs de-escalation and to provide a gesture of goodwill to the US side in its aspiration to ease sanctions and restore the nuclear agreement, which could cut off Netanyahu’s path to attacking it.
In a remarkable shift, Kuwait resorted to describing the Houthis as “the concerned authorities in Sana’a in the Republic of Yemen” instead of their usual designation. This expression, previously adopted by Qatar and Oman, indicates a convergence in the Gulf tone towards the Houthis. This linguistic alignment carries significant political implications, as it may reflect broader Gulf coordination, perhaps in conjunction with US efforts, to create an atmosphere for a possible return to the nuclear agreement with Iran.
Mareb Al-Ward – Yemeni Journalist and Researcher
Closer to a Field Settlement
The picture is not entirely clear yet, but what seems certain is that the Houthis have emerged from this agreement politically victorious—despite having cost Yemen billions of dollars in damage to its already fragile infrastructure.
What has occurred is closer to a field settlement than a final political agreement. It is a settlement that allows the US to safeguard its interests in the Red Sea while granting the Houthis room to remain in place, and possibly to reposition themselves both internally and externally.
As for the Yemeni government, it has been completely sidelined in this process. It had no presence in the consultations, not even in the political discourse. This marginalization further weakens it, making it appear more like a local extension of the coalition rather than an independent national entity. This reality, to be frank, is not new—but it has become more apparent today.
If we assume that things are heading toward a settlement—though this is unlikely in the short term—then this understanding will likely benefit the Houthis in upcoming negotiations. It may even open diplomatic doors that have long been closed to them. In the long run, the absence of the Yemeni state from this critical decision-making moment will negatively impact its ability to reclaim sovereignty or impose any national agenda.
By Mohammed Al-Jaradi – Yemeni journalist and researcher specializing in Yemeni and Gulf affairs
Its Relation to US-Iranian Negotiations
Trump’s campaign began with a maximum pressure strategy on Iran, seeking to force it to the negotiating table under US terms, exploiting the axis’s weakness. The focus was on restoring freedom of navigation rather than confronting the broader Houthi threat to trade, peace, and security.
The Houthis are likely to continue their attacks on Israel as a separate front linked to the “axis of resistance,” both to show solidarity with Palestine and as a tool to assert regional and popular importance and internal mobilization.
Oman, an integral part of efforts to facilitate dialogue between the US and Iran, played a leading role in mediating between the US and the Houthis, partially addressing US concerns in the Red Sea, leading to the ceasefire agreement. Will the US-Iranian talks witness further progress as a result?
Driven by its national strategic interests, Iran faced several policy options: abandoning the Houthis amid setbacks in Syria and Lebanon; coordinating de-escalation—similar to the moves of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces—to maintain its strategic foothold near the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa; or continuing uncontrolled escalation through Bab al-Mandab against an unpredictable Trump administration.
The ultimate outcome of the truce remains uncertain, and its resilience depends on at least two factors: the extent of the Houthis’ fear and the progress in nuclear negotiations with Iran. While the US lacks a coherent strategy in Yemen and the Red Sea, the Houthis appear to be aware of the shifting geopolitical currents. Their agreement to cease hostilities may be a temporary tactical maneuver aimed at preserving their position while avoiding escalation that could lead to regional losses.
Bottom line: The Houthis respond to reasonable pressure, but they often employ it to their advantage, aware of the absence of a clear international strategy regarding Yemen. Is anyone learning?
Ibrahim Jalal – Researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The Worst Challenge for the Government Since Its Collapse in 2014
The agreement between the US and the Houthi militia on a ceasefire regarding maritime attacks presents the Yemeni government with its most serious challenge since its collapse and flight from Sana’a in 2014.
While the militia imposed a blockade on Israeli maritime navigation, its primary goal was to threaten Saudi Arabia—the main backer of the Yemeni government—and the UAE. In July 2024, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi appeared emboldened, declaring: “A port for a port, and an airport for an airport.”
Under the agreement between the Houthis and Trump, the Houthis have secured, at least theoretically, U.S. neutrality in future confrontations, as outlined in the deal. With Washington stating that it would not intervene in Yemen’s internal conflict, the Houthis now find themselves in a stronger position than before—or at the very least, facing no declared red lines from abroad. Although the agreement has not been publicly released, there are indications that sanctions could be lifted, the terrorist designation relaxed, or the deal leniently enforced.
The impact of the agreement is evident in the political language adopted by countries such as Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait, which have referred to the Houthis as “the relevant authorities in Sana’a.” While Saudi Arabia has refrained from using this designation, its statement has rekindled hopes for a return to the political process—one that had stalled at the end of 2023, along with the associated roadmap.
That roadmap was rendered obsolete by the Houthi maritime attacks and had been shelved. However, Riyadh’s recent statement may be seen as a message acknowledging the outcomes of the U.S.-Houthi clashes and their agreement, and a willingness to revisit the peace framework.
The experiences of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria suggest that control on the ground and strong internal organization often outweigh reliance on international recognition or diplomatic positioning.
Ultimately, the main obstacle to full Houthi control of Yemen is not the exiled government in Riyadh, its shrinking international recognition, or the U.S. terrorist designation of the group. Rather, it is the capacity of popular resistance and loyal government forces to confront the Houthis that remains the decisive factor.
By Salman Al-Maqrami – Journalist and Political Researcher
A Crippling Blow to the Government
For the Yemeni government, this agreement represents a crippling blow. After weeks of seeking U.S. support against the Houthis, Washington chose to negotiate directly with Tehran—bypassing the government entirely. The deal highlights the government’s inability to convince the US to eliminate what it has long labeled a terrorist threat.
Trump’s claim of a “Houthi surrender” directly contradicts his earlier rhetoric about “completely destroying the Houthis.” More troubling, however, is that the agreement signals a potential vulnerability in the US—suggesting that continuous asymmetric pressure can wear it down. This could embolden other Iranian Revolutionary Guard proxies to adopt similar tactics.
As for Israel, if it was excluded from the terms of the agreement, this might be interpreted as a tacit US green light for Israeli airstrikes on Houthi positions—or it may hint at a broader deal over Gaza looming on the horizon. Either way, this is Tehran’s design—not Oman’s, not Washington’s, and certainly not Sana’a’s.
By Fatima Abo Alasrar – Researcher at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
Economic Impact on Supply Chains
In reality, it is too early to predict the effects and repercussions of the US administration’s agreement with the Houthis in Yemen on the economic situation, or to confirm a breakthrough in facilitating supply chains to the ports of Al Hudaidah Governorate.
The features of the agreement are not yet definitively clear. Moreover, the administration of the previous US president still designates the Houthi group as a foreign terrorist organization and has imposed many restrictions on the Houthis’ commercial and financial activities. The Houthi group remains unable to access the international banking system.
Another issue is that the strikes on Al Hudaidah ports have caused significant damage to port facilities and installations, and they are currently almost completely inoperable. This imposes additional restrictions on the process of imports reaching these Houthi-controlled ports.
With the continued sanctions imposed by the US Treasury against shipping companies cooperating with the Houthis, it becomes very difficult for international shipping lines to resume their shipping activities through Al Hudaidah ports. Maritime shipping companies will not risk their interests and businesses by cooperating with the Houthi group. This creates a high probability that the flow of ships and imports to Yemen will be directed through the ports of Aden and Mukalla.
Wafiq Saleh – Journalist and Economic Researcher
Smoke rises from an Israeli raid in Sanaa – Reuters
What’s the Deal Today? – An American Perspective
All we have are verbal statements, but what we do know is that the US has agreed to halt its bombing campaign, and the Houthis have agreed to a ceasefire targeting US ships.
As for other vessels in the Red Sea, things remain a bit unclear. The Houthis haven’t attacked container ships in the Red Sea since around December—well before the latest round of airstrikes began. Still, shipping companies are likely to want more reassurance before fully resuming operations in the region.
What about the conflict with Israel? The deal doesn’t seem to include any mention of Houthi strikes on Israel. Just two days after a Houthi missile reached Tel Aviv’s airport, the implied message from Washington appears to be: Israelis and Houthis can fight it out without US involvement.
What does this tell us about Trump’s foreign policy? Today’s announcement suggests that the administration is eager to avoid another “forever war” in the Middle East. But it remains unclear whether this agreement actually makes the region any safer. The Houthis are claiming the deal as a victory over US, and it’s likely we haven’t heard the last of it.
By Patrick Reevs – Senior Policy Editor at Vox
