The Yemeni Paradox: Violence Without State-Building, and Legitimacy Without Power

Introduction:

Theories of state formation are often misused outside their historical contexts, either by turning them into ready-made formulas or by employing them to justify contemporary political realities to which their original conditions do not apply. Charles Tilly’s thesis on the relationship between war and state-building is among the theories most frequently subjected to such simplification. Yet a careful reading of Tilly not only illuminates the mechanisms through which the European state emerged, but also opens the way to a deeper understanding of why state-building projects fail in fragile and contemporary contexts—among them the Yemeni case.

First: Tilly’s Central Question – Why Did Most Polities Fail to Become States?

Charles Tilly argued that the core of his theoretical project was not to explain the emergence of the European state per se, but rather to explain why the overwhelming majority of political entities failed to transform into states. The puzzle that preoccupied him was the sharp decline in the number of political units in Europe—from around 500 entities in 1500 to roughly 20 by 1900. Tilly concluded that the decisive factor in this “historical selection” was not legitimacy or moral superiority, but the inability to adapt to the pressures of war and geopolitical–military competition.

Second: War as a Mechanism of Historical Elimination

The record of “state deaths” reinforces this conclusion. Historical evidence indicates that war was the most destructive factor in eliminating political entities since the feudal era, during which hundreds of polities disappeared, with only a limited number surviving to become stable states. Recent empirical studies confirm that more than 75 percent of state collapses in modern history resulted from violent death. Accordingly, Tilly draws a close link between inefficiency in waging or preparing for war and the failure to develop the political and administrative institutions necessary for state formation. Political units least capable of managing organized violence were, at the same time, the least capable of building a state.

Third: The “Racketeer” Thesis and Its Theoretical Limits

In this context, Tilly advanced his most controversial thesis, likening European state-builders to racketeers: they imposed protection, monopolized violence, extracted resources, and eliminated competitors by force, before these violent structures gradually evolved into “legitimate” states that monopolized violence and reorganized it legally.

However, despite its explanatory power, this thesis does not claim that possession of weapons alone creates a state. Rather, it underscores that the capacity to wage war was a foundational condition within a specific historical context—not a universally applicable formula. War was an entry point to state-building, not the state itself.

Fourth: The Paradoxes of Applying the Theory to the Regional Context

When this analysis is applied to the contemporary regional context, striking paradoxes emerge. In the Gulf, for example, the United Arab Emirates appears more willing to use direct and indirect military force to defend its interests and expand its influence. This has granted it political and regional weight exceeding its geographic and demographic size, in comparison with major regional powers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which act with greater caution and incur higher political and strategic costs.

Fifth: The Yemeni Case – Armed Actors and the Absence of a State Project

In Yemen, the paradox is even more pronounced. The actors that have demonstrated a genuine willingness to wage war and bear its political and military costs are the Houthi movement and the Southern Transitional Council. Both possess instruments of violence, mobilization networks, and a readiness for prolonged conflict, which has made them real actors in the arena of power.

In contrast, “legitimacy,” in its current form, has effectively exited the logic of hard competition over power and no longer constitutes a project capable of imposing itself as a state. It has withdrawn from Tilly’s logic of decisiveness and struggle, in which only those who possess the will to fight and the means to do so remain in the field.

Sixth: Why Military Capacity Is Not Enough

Yet this conclusion, despite its partial validity, remains incomplete without a deeper analysis of the nature of the state itself. The Yemeni context clearly demonstrates that the ability to endure militarily does not necessarily translate into the ability to build a state. The Houthis, despite their military control over the capital and large parts of the north, face profound structural challenges in governance: managing the economy, providing services, maintaining social cohesion, and producing legitimacy that goes beyond coercion and ideological mobilization. What they possess is de facto authority, not a stable state.

Seventh: The Gap Between the European Experience and the Yemeni Case

Here lies the fundamental gap between the European experience analyzed by Tilly and the contemporary Yemeni case. European state-builders waged their wars as holders of independent sovereign projects aimed at building states, not as agents of external projects. Moreover, their conflicts, despite their violence, unfolded within a clear horizon: unifying the political space, monopolizing taxation, and constructing sustainable governing institutions.

In Yemen, by contrast, violence takes place within a regional proxy war. The Houthis and the STC, despite possessing the will and tools of war, are constrained by regional ceilings that define their trajectories and limit their room for maneuver. Their violence, in this sense, is not foundational violence for an independent national state, but functional violence tied to struggles over influence that extend beyond Yemen and its borders.

Conclusion: The Yemeni Paradox – Violence Without state Foundation

Accordingly, the conclusion imposed by this analysis is that the capacity to wage war is a necessary condition for any state project, but it is not a sufficient one. A state is not built by weapons alone, but by local legitimacy, institutional capacity, social cohesion, and an inclusive national horizon. Without these elements, weapons shift from being tools of state-building to obstacles to its emergence, and Tilly’s logic is transformed from a precise historical explanation into a contemporary misunderstanding that justifies the persistence of armed forces without producing a real state.

In this sense, the Yemeni tragedy lies in a deadly paradox: the forces most capable of fighting are not necessarily the most capable of building a state, while the forces that are supposed to carry the state project have withdrawn from the logic of conflict, leaving the field open to violence without a state horizon and to a struggle with no clear political end.